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First Amendment Cosmopolitanism, Skepticism,
and Democracy
TIMOTHY ZICK*
This is a response to Professor Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr.’s review of my
book, The Cosmopolitan First Amendment: Protecting Transborder
Expressive and Religious Liberties (Cambridge University Press, 2014). The
response explains the basic principles of First Amendment cosmopolitanism
and highlights the importance of the First Amendment’s transborder
dimension. It also responds to skeptical and critical reactions to some of the
book’s arguments. Finally, the response elaborates on First Amendment
cosmopolitanism’s relationship to democratic values.
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I. INTRODUCTION
I am immensely grateful for Professor Ronald J. Krotoszynski’s thoughtful
review of my book, The Cosmopolitan First Amendment: Protecting
Transborder Expressive and Religious Liberties, and for his linking my work
with that of Professor Martin Redish.1 The review deftly combines two books
that at first glance may appear to have little to do with one another, save that
each is about the First Amendment.2 My primary goals in this response are
threefold: (1) to elaborate on the relationship between cosmopolitanism and
the First Amendment’s transborder dimension, (2) to respond to some
skepticism regarding First Amendment cosmopolitanism, and (3) to highlight
the connection between First Amendment cosmopolitanism and democratic
values.
* Mills E. Godwin, Jr., Professor of Law, William & Mary Law School. I would like
to thank Professor Ron Krotoszynski for taking the time to review my book. I also thank
the Ohio State Law Journal for providing me with an opportunity to publish this response,
and for their excellent editorial assistance.
1 Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Free Speech Paternalism and Free Speech
Exceptionalism: Pervasive Distrust of Government and the Contemporary First
Amendment, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 659 (2015).
2 See generally MARTIN H. REDISH, THE ADVERSARY FIRST AMENDMENT: FREE
EXPRESSION AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2013); TIMOTHY ZICK,
THE COSMOPOLITAN FIRST AMENDMENT: PROTECTING TRANSBORDER EXPRESSIVE AND
RELIGIOUS LIBERTIES (2014).
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II. COSMOPOLITANISM AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT’S TRANSBORDER
DIMENSION
Professor Krotoszynski’s review focuses on one important aspect of my
project—namely, a call for First Amendment protection for cross-border and
beyond-border individual liberties, in particular freedom of speech.3 He
supports my proposal in principle, although he is skeptical that U.S. courts—in
particular, the Supreme Court—will move in this direction.4 I want to begin
this response by describing my project and thesis more comprehensively,
holding my response to skeptics, including Professor Krotoszynski, until Part
III.
For the most part, Americans tend to treat the First Amendment primarily
as a domestic concern. To be sure, we notice when our free speech doctrines or
standards conflict with or differ from liberty regimes in other nations.
However, by and large Americans tend to focus on protecting domestic
freedom of expression and freedom of religion. There is, of course, plenty to
be concerned about in this domain—i.e., the free speech rights of corporations,
the rights of public protesters to assemble and speak, protection of press
sources, the place of religious symbols in the public square, and the proper
scope of religious accommodations. These are all important issues, worthy of
the attention given them by scholars, commentators, and the public at large.
However, as I explain in the book, our First Amendment has another
critically important dimension.5 Speech traverses and transcends international
borders, citizens and non-citizens commingle across territorial boundaries for
expressive and religious purposes, states and localities weigh in on matters of
global concern, and the First Amendment is discussed, invoked, and defended
in various global forums. Further, the fact that speech is increasingly subject to
the laws of several nations at once raises challenging jurisdictional and
conflicts of laws questions. Foreign libel judgments, foreign religious norms,
and foreign plaintiffs are also creating distinctive challenges for courts and
other U.S. officials concerned about preserving exceptional First Amendment
protections. As my book discusses in Chapter Seven, religious and other
charities also operate across international borders.6 Finally, the U.S.
government interacts with citizens, aliens, and religious leaders and groups
around the world. All of these things occur in what I refer to as the First
Amendment’s transborder dimension.
As it relates to expressive and religious liberties, the law of this
transborder dimension is unsettled—or at least unclear in certain respects. It
3 See Krotoszynski, supra note 1, at 665–73.
4 See id. at 678 (“To be clear, I agree with Zick that [transborder] speech deserves a

full measure of protection under the First Amendment. Existing doctrine, however, seems
to cut strongly against this outcome.”).
5 See ZICK, supra note 2, ch. 1 (examining the First Amendment’s “transborder
dimension”).
6 See id. ch. 7.
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would likely surprise many Americans that the letter they intend to send to an
acquaintance or family member in Paris or Peru is not clearly protected by the
First Amendment’s free speech or press guarantees.7 International travel,
cross-border association, charitable religious giving, and other cross-border
expressive and religious activities are similarly subject to diminished First
Amendment protection under U.S. precedents, laws, and regulations.8 As well,
under the letter and logic of U.S. anti-terrorism policies, American citizens and
aliens abroad may be subjected to censorship, reporting restrictions, and even
prior restraints.9 These are just a few examples of basic liberties—speech,
press, travel, association, and free exercise of religion—that Americans take
for granted in their native land.
A central theme of my book is that we need to think more carefully and
systematically about the First Amendment’s foundations, principles, and
domain as these things apply to a more globally interconnected citizenry, and a
more porous world in which territorial borders are becoming less important to
things like information flow and sovereign authority. However, as I explain in
the book, once the discussion turns from expressive and religious activities
within U.S. territorial borders, the First Amendment far too often tends to
disappear.10 What might have been great First Amendment precedents have
ultimately become foreign affairs, immigration, or national security precedents
in which freedom of expression and religion play only minor roles. Too often,
opportunities to connect U.S. citizens to foreign nations, or distant persons,
have succumbed to a restrictive regime in which territorial and security
justifications produce provincial laws and precedents.11
Owing to various social and political developments, including
globalization, the digitization of expression, and concerns about global
terrorism, cross-border conversation and commingling have become critically
important First Amendment concerns.12 To be sure, transborder mobility,
expression, association, and religious commingling are not yet as important as
their domestic counterparts. However, they are becoming a focal dimension of
First Amendment free expression, free association, and free exercise of
religion.
The Internet is at the center of this change. Digitized speech is not
completely constrained by geography. Indeed, in some respects it challenges
7 See id. at 142–45 (addressing the First Amendment status of cross-border
communications).
8 See id. at 147–51 (discussing cross-border association), 232–34 (discussing crossborder religious activities), 239–40 (discussing charitable giving, or zakat).
9 See id. ch. 6 (examining expressive rights of citizens and aliens abroad).
10 See id. at 70–74 (criticizing judicial “quasi-recognition” of transborder expressive
liberties).
11 See ZICK, supra note 2, at 74 (“As an interpretive modality, quasi-recognition has at
times licensed the political branches to enact laws, regulations, and policies that restrict
transborder information flow, association, and other activities.”).
12 See id. at 58–59 (discussing digitization and globalization).
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old regimes of sovereign authority, which were based primarily on territorial
boundaries. Sometimes fleetingly and sometimes more permanently, digitized
speech resides in multiple nations at once. It flows not in letters and cables, but
through vastly more efficient and powerful worldwide search engines. The
peoples of the world are also more mobile than ever. Cheaper travel,
international commitments to the free flow of persons across borders, and
digitized communication have all facilitated robust transborder commingling.
The specter of terrorism is also shaping or transforming the First
Amendment’s transborder dimension. In the twenty-first century, the United
States and other nations have an acute interest in regulating or policing speech,
press, association, and religious liberties regardless of where they are
exercised. As I discuss in Chapter Five of my book, Justice Holmes’s concerns
regarding “falsely shouting fire in a theater”13 now extend to a global theater
in which speech rapidly traverses or sometimes transcends international
borders, individuals associate in digital networks, and information is much
more difficult to exclude from territories.14 The United States is actively
engaged in a now-decades-long war with violent extremists who reside on
both sides of the border. Whether America’s enduring commitment to robust
debate will extend to Koran-burners, terrorist sympathizers, and information
intermediaries with global reach remains to be seen.
Beyond U.S. borders, in the community of nations, U.S. foreign policy
now includes not just a specific Internet plank but, increasingly, an
appreciation for the need to respect international human rights, manage
religious pluralism, and facilitate engagement with religious leaders and
organizations. Here, too, there are complications. For example, the
Establishment Clause’s geographic domain is as unsettled as the rest of the
First Amendment’s transborder dimension.15 The extent to which U.S. courts
can or should enforce international human rights is a point of conflict.
Moreover, as the United States continues to engage in diplomatic forums
across the globe, it must contend with increasingly powerful corporate voices,
state and local-level discourse regarding “glocal”16 concerns, and private
citizens who wish to be heard on matters of global concern. All of this
transnational cacophony can affect American statecraft around the world.
Two recent cases highlight some of the complications that can arise in the
First Amendment’s transborder dimension. In the first case, a group of
American writers and producers sued the Chinese search engine Baidu, Inc. in
13 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
14 See ZICK, supra note 2, ch. 5 (examining harmful and other types of speech in the

“global theater”).
15 See id. at 255–62 (discussing the extraterritorial application of First Amendment
anti-establishment standards).
16 Glocalization can be defined as “the interpenetration of the global and the local
resulting in unique outcomes in different geographic areas.” George Ritzer, Credit Cards
and the Globalization of Nothing, 24 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 313, 318 (2005) (citation
omitted).
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a U.S. district court in New York.17 The plaintiffs alleged that the state search
engine’s algorithms blocked Chinese and American citizens from discovering
their pro-democracy material.18 The court dismissed the case, ruling that
Baidu’s search engine algorithms constituted speech entitled to protection
under the First Amendment, and that Baidu was entitled to exercise its
editorial discretion to suppress the flow of pro-democracy information.19 The
court perceived no irony in its free speech ruling. It stated: “[T]he First
Amendment protects Baidu's right to advocate for systems of government
other than democracy (in China or elsewhere) just as surely as it protects
Plaintiffs' rights to advocate for democracy.”20
In the second case, a civil rights organization based in Kampala, Uganda
sued Scott Liveley, an American citizen residing in Springfield,
Massachusetts, for violating international laws prohibiting the persecution of
individuals based on sexual orientation and gender identity.21 Liveley was
accused of fomenting harassment and intimidation of gays and others through
his speech and association activities, which occurred both in Uganda and the
United States.22 The Ugandan civil rights group sued Liveley under the federal
Alien Tort Statute, which grants jurisdiction to U.S. courts in certain actions
involving violations of the law of nations.23 A federal district court in
Massachusetts rejected Liveley’s motion to dismiss the complaint, which was
based in part on the argument that the First Amendment protects his expressive
activities. With regard to Liveley’s free speech arguments, the court concluded
that he had incited “a crime against humanity” as well as participated in
“management of actual crimes—repression of free expression through
intimidation, false arrests, assaults, and criminalization of peaceful activity and
even the status of being gay or lesbian—that no jury could find to enjoy the
protection of the First Amendment.”24 The court also rejected Liveley’s
contention that his actions are protected by the First Amendment’s Petition
Clause, which guarantees the right to “petition the Government for a redress of
grievances.”25 The court held that the Petition Clause does not extend to
efforts to persuade foreign governments to change their laws.26 A federal

17 Zhang v. Baidu.com Inc., 10 F. Supp. 3d 433 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
18 Id. at 434.
19 Id. at 440–43.
20 Id. at 443 (emphasis added).
21 See Sexual Minorities Uganda v. Liveley, 960 F. Supp. 2d 304, 309–10 (D. Mass.

2013).

22 See id. at 311–13 (discussing allegations against Liveley).
23 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012) (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any

civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a
treaty of the United States.”).
24 Liveley, 960 F. Supp. 2d at 329.
25 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
26 Liveley, 960 F. Supp. 2d at 329.
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appeals court recently rejected Liveley’s appeal, allowing the case to proceed
to trial.
The Baidu and Liveley cases highlight the important intersection between
international borders and First Amendment expressive rights. They raise
complicated jurisdictional and territorial issues. In the Baidu case, plaintiffs
seek to hold a foreign search engine liable for suppression and censorship of
pro-democracy information otherwise available on the Internet.27 In the
Liveley case, plaintiffs seek to hold an American citizen liable for
communications and associative acts that occurred, in part, in Uganda.28
In addition to raising questions about the territorial domain of First
Amendment rights, the two cases demonstrate that, in the modern era,
governmental regulatory and other sovereign concerns also traverse territorial
borders. Both cases involve the exercise of sovereign authority over speech
and other activities that occurred in more than one nation. The Internet is a
global speech forum, and efforts to regulate expressive activities in that space
will frequently implicate or affect more than one sovereign. Likewise, as
citizens of the world travel and engage in expressive and religious activities,
the laws of multiple nations and even supranational governance institutions
may be implicated. The role of the First Amendment in international human
rights litigation remains largely undefined.
We do not have a framework for thinking through transborder and
transnational First Amendment issues and concerns like those raised in Baidu
and Liveley. Courts, commentators, and elected officials have not devoted
nearly the amount of time and energy to the First Amendment’s transborder
dimension as they have allotted to its domestic domain. Unlike other First
Amendment works, my book focuses specifically on the problems of this
dimension.
What approach ought we to take to the myriad transborder expressive and
religious concerns that are likely to arise in the transborder dimension? What,
if any, restraint does the First Amendment place on American officials who
seek to restrict or prevent cross-border conversation or commingling? To what
extent does it shield Americans’ expressive activities abroad, or protect the
expressive activities of aliens? What ought to be our approach to foreign
expressive and religious laws and principles that seek entry, physically or
otherwise, to our shores? What relevance or purpose does the First
Amendment have in terms of U.S. engagement with the larger community of
nations? These are some of the principal questions I examine in the book.
Some, including those assessing the scope of free speech and association,
require doctrinal assessments and answers. Others raise concerns that
transcend domestic adjudication and the particulars of First Amendment
doctrine. All require that as a polity, the United States think carefully about
what it means to have First Amendment rights in a globalized society.
27 Zhang v. Baidu.com Inc., 10 F. Supp. 3d 433, 434 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
28 See Liveley, 960 F. Supp. 2d at 304.
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To that end, the book describes and defends a “cosmopolitan” First
Amendment.29 As a perspective or orientation regarding the First
Amendment’s transborder domain, cosmopolitanism differs markedly from its
provincial or parochial counterpart. In the book, I summarize provincialism as
denoting “a general orientation regarding the First Amendment that is limited
in terms of geographic range or scope, somewhat insular in terms of outlook
and biases, and strongly exceptionalist.”30 Unlike the provincial account,
which generally focuses attention inward, First Amendment cosmopolitanism
gazes outward to and beyond America’s territorial borders. The cosmopolitan
First Amendment recognizes a broader territorial domain, is more welcoming
of foreign persons, ideas, attachments, and authorities, views transborder
conversation and commingling as central First Amendment activities and
concerns with global implications, and seeks to globally situate—and
sometimes even challenge—First Amendment exceptionalism.31
First Amendment cosmopolitanism seeks to integrate and, where possible,
apply First Amendment principles and values in an interconnected, pluralist,
and globalized world. Its principles and proposals are directed mainly at U.S.
officials, institutions, and citizens. Among other things, a cosmopolitan
approach to the First Amendment supports the following substantive results:
full protection for citizens’ First Amendment rights regardless of borders or
frontiers; a response to the threat of global terrorism that respects and
preserves, to the fullest extent possible, cross-border conversation and
commingling; and protection for the expressive and religious liberties of aliens
who are within the custody and control of U.S. authorities and subject to
American laws
Cosmopolitanism offers a lens or perspective from which to consider
transborder First Amendment issues. It is not a roadmap or blueprint for
generating a unitary global regime of expressive and religious liberties.
Cosmopolitanism does not support or call for jettisoning fundamental First
Amendment principles in favor of purportedly more “enlightened” foreign
ones. At the same time, cosmopolitanism does not support or entail global
exportation of First Amendment doctrines and standards to foreign regimes.
Any “one-size-fits-all” approach, whether influenced by exceptional American
or international standards, would be doomed from the start. Indeed, there are
many nations across the world that will likely never come to respect anything
like the commitment to expressive and religious freedoms enshrined in our
First Amendment. For the many nations that do protect these liberties to a
significant degree, my book examines some common ground but also
addresses points of intersection and conflict.
29 See ZICK, supra note 2, at 76–100 (describing the principles of First Amendment

cosmopolitanism).
30 Id. at 62; see also id. at 62–76 (discussing characteristics of First Amendment
provincialism).
31 See id. at 77 (summarizing principles of First Amendment cosmopolitanism).

712

OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 76:3

Returning to the Baidu and Liveley cases, we can get a more concrete
sense of how a cosmopolitan approach would influence or affect actual results
in the First Amendment’s transborder dimension. Baidu, a foreign speaker,
was hailed before a U.S. court and subjected to U.S. civil rights laws for its
expressive activity on the Internet. Although Baidu’s censorship strikes at the
heart of core First Amendment principles, including respect for democratic
rule and access to information about democratic forms of government, as the
district court concluded, the First Amendment protects the rights of all
speakers subject to U.S. laws to advocate in favor of non-democratic
principles. The United States may press China diplomatically and otherwise to
change its perspectives and its actions at home, but when it or its people are
subject to U.S. laws, cosmopolitanism requires that First Amendment
protections apply with full force.
The Liveley case is more complicated, in part owing to some uncertainty
regarding whether U.S. alien tort law applies extraterritorially.32 Assuming it
does, plaintiffs are seeking to hold an American speaker liable for speech
uttered, in part, beyond U.S. borders, which they contend violates the law of
nations.33 Under a cosmopolitan approach, the First Amendment protects
citizens from censorship or suppression of speech at the hands of their own
government—regardless of geographic location. However, it does not operate
as a shield for American speakers who ignore foreign and international laws
when they act beyond U.S. shores.34 Foreign governments and international
bodies are not bound by the First Amendment and are entitled to enforce their
laws against citizens and aliens alike.
Some might object that if a U.S. court were to enter judgment against
Liveley for engaging in what would be protected speech and association if
these things occurred solely within the United States, the court would be
replacing exceptional First Amendment free speech protections with lessprotective international standards.35 In Chapter Nine, I discuss an approach to
potential conflicts like this that I refer to as “cosmopolitan engagement.”36
Under this approach, American courts would take seriously the claims of
foreign nations and international institutions to enforce their own laws
(including their own speech laws) and values. The First Amendment would not
act as a shield at the border, excluding all foreign judgments, laws, and
32 See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1664 (2013) (describing a
presumption against extraterritorial application).
33 See generally Zhang v. Baidu.com Inc., 10 F. Supp. 3d 433 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
34 See ZICK, supra note 2, at 331 (“[W]hen U.S. citizens visit abroad, their speech and
other activities are subject to regulation under the libel, hate speech, and other laws in force
in host nations.”).
35 Of course, this assumes that Liveley’s speech would be protected under the First
Amendment. The district court concluded that Liveley’s speech was in furtherance of an
international crime. Sexual Minorities Uganda v. Liveley, 960 F. Supp. 2d 304, 329 (D.
Mass. 2013).
36 ZICK, supra note 2, ch. 9.
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transnational legal authorities. Rather, in cases of transnational conflicts,
courts would engage in a cosmopolitan choice of law analysis that focuses on,
as Paul Berman has written, “the extent to which the various parties might be
deemed to have affiliations with the possible communities seeking to impose
their norms.”37 Thus, if Liveley engaged in a significant portion of the
contested expressive activities abroad, and his speech clearly violated
international laws, the First Amendment would not necessarily bar the alien
tort lawsuit. On the other hand, if most of the expressive activity occurred
within the United States and if it were clearly protected under American free
speech standards, under a cosmopolitan approach the First Amendment would
bar enforcement of international law.
As the Liveley case shows, First Amendment cosmopolitanism does not
always lead to rigid rules or definitive answers to transborder questions. Under
the provincial approach, courts have generally tended to avoid transborder
concerns by ruling that foreign and domestic plaintiffs lack standing to
challenge certain cross-border restrictions, grudgingly accepting that U.S.
citizens might have some First Amendment rights at and beyond our borders,
and deferring to federal officials in cases involving cross-border and
transborder claims.38 American legislators have responded to efforts to enforce
foreign speech laws by banning their recognition or enforcement in U.S.
courts.39 First Amendment cosmopolitanism rejects these approaches as
insufficiently respectful of foreign laws and interests where transborder speech
conflicts arise. Unlike its provincial counterpart, cosmopolitanism requires that
courts and other officials grapple with thorny inter-jurisdictional concerns
rather than reflexively invoke the First Amendment whenever expressive
activities are involved. Courts and officials can and should preserve
fundamental First Amendment principles. However, they should not do so at
the expense of foreign victims and foreign governments who also have
significant transnational interests.
There is nothing radical in either cosmopolitanism’s approach or its
prescriptions. Indeed, as I argue in the book, cosmopolitanism is part of the
marrow of our First Amendment.40 Our Founders were wary of some foreign
influences, but did not fear cross-border conversation and commingling—
indeed, they openly and enthusiastically welcomed it. They recognized
dangers and threats from abroad, but did not treat foreign persons and ideas as
37 Paul Schiff Berman, Towards a Cosmopolitan Vision of Conflicts of Laws:

Redefining Governmental Interests in a Global Era, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1819, 1822 (2005).
Chapter Nine describes the approach in detail and applies it to things such as recognition of
foreign libel judgments. See generally ZICK, supra note 2, ch. 9.
38 See, e.g., ZICK, supra note 2, at 70–74 (describing provincialism’s “quasirecognition” of transborder liberties).
39 See id. at 334–35 (discussing the federal SPEECH Act, which bars enforcement of
foreign libel judgments).
40 See id. at 77–82 (describing constitutional origins of First Amendment
cosmopolitanism).
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inherently dangerous. The Founders and early Americans participated in a
“republic of letters” that crossed international borders.41 They respected and in
some cases imitated foreign laws. As our Declaration of Independence attests,
the architects of American government had a “decent respect [for] the opinions
of mankind.”42 In many respects, America’s Founders and subsequent
generations were themselves cosmopolitans.
Of course, nativism and xenophobia have also been on prominent display
during various periods of American history. At their core, many of the critical
battles regarding First Amendment freedoms involved fear of foreigners,
discomfort or hatred of foreign ideas, and distrust of foreign religions.43 The
very First Amendment principles that have laid many of those fears to rest, and
pushed the nation toward support for a pluralistic culture that has welcomed
(or at least tolerated) foreign influences are cosmopolitan principles. All of the
principal American First Amendment free speech theories or justifications—
self-government, the search for truth, and individual autonomy—are consistent
with granting protection to transborder expressive liberties.44 Moreover, our
history and doctrines relating to religious freedom support extending free
exercise and anti-establishment limitations to foreign visitors, foreign laws,
and the actions of U.S. officials wherever they are located.45
In sum, the First Amendment’s origins and best traditions support
protecting the right to receive information originating in foreign nations,
welcoming visitors to our shores for expressive and religious purposes,
reporting on matters of global concern from foreign locations, and reaching
across territorial borders to associate with persons and organizations. At a
minimum, First Amendment cosmopolitanism seeks equality of recognition
for these and related transborder rights.
However, in a broader sense, First Amendment cosmopolitanism posits a
role for First Amendment rights, principles, and norms in global forums. This
aspect of First Amendment cosmopolitanism is the subject of Part III of the
book. At first glance, the First Amendment would seem to have little relevance
to official U.S. activities within the community of nations. International
diplomacy and foreign relations are not typically the domain of individual
rights. However, a more cosmopolitan approach to the First Amendment’s
transborder dimension highlights areas and contexts in which free speech and
religious liberty principles can guide U.S. behavior in global forums.
With regard to the community of nations, in substance First Amendment
cosmopolitanism supports the following: as mentioned, a pluralistic approach
41 See David M. Golove & Daniel J. Hulsebosch, A Civilized Nation: The Early
American Constitution, the Law of Nations, and the Pursuit of International Recognition,
85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 932, 974 (2010) (discussing the early transborder “republic of letters”).
42 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776).
43 See ZICK, supra note 2, at 65–66 (discussing twentieth century efforts to suppress
“foreign” ideologies and discrimination against “foreign” religious faiths).
44 See id. at 85–90 (discussing First Amendment justifications and cosmopolitanism).
45 See id. at 229–32 (examining justifications for transborder religious liberties).
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to judgment enforcement and foreign laws (including foreign speech laws) that
respects the liberty regimes and interests of foreign governments and peoples;
an expressive or “discursive” approach to debates in global and international
forums that allows for multiple voices and respects dissenting views; and an
agenda for exporting First Amendment values that is robust and confident, but
also sensitive to foreign concerns about unlawful intervention and rights
imperialism. More specifically, First Amendment cosmopolitanism proposes
that U.S. officials alter their approach to enforcement of foreign judgments,
permit or affirmatively invite individuals and sub-national governments to
weigh in on matters of global concern, honor their obligations to neither
directly support nor suppress religious activities abroad, participate in rather
than boycott treaty and other negotiations (even if they will not lead to
adoption of First Amendment standards), and calibrate policies such that
American free expression and religious liberty principles are suggested and
robustly defended but not imposed on foreign regimes.
In sum, cosmopolitan principles support and facilitate conversation and
commingling not just at the individual level, but also at the national and
international levels. From a cosmopolitan perspective, the First Amendment’s
domain extends beyond the province of individual liberties to the manner in
which the community of nations discusses and enforces core principles and
commitments relating to expressive and religious rights.

III. SKEPTICISM REGARDING FIRST AMENDMENT COSMOPOLITANISM
Some Americans are likely to be skeptical with regard to, or even strongly
oppose, some of the cosmopolitan principles or substantive results discussed in
my book. First Amendment provincialism has a long and firm hold on the
American legal system and the public’s imagination. It is firmly embedded in
American laws, policies, and institutions.
In certain cases, the stakes of cross-border conversation and commingling
are likely to be very high indeed. Cross-border expression and association may
have deadly effects, and certain kinds of transborder information flow can be
quite dangerous. What is more, governments have strong interests in
protecting their citizens, policing territorial borders, and preserving national
security. Similarly, some maintain that the First Amendment must be protected
against foreign judgments and similar encroachments, which threaten to
undermine if not displace traditional protections for free speech and religion.
Others would argue that First Amendment principles and values have little
force or influence in the often murky areas of diplomacy and foreign relations.
I respond to these and other concerns in the book, and will not repeat each
of the cosmopolitan rejoinders. Put simply, while I acknowledge these
concerns, cosmopolitanism rejects the second-class treatment of transborder
First Amendment rights. Concerns regarding dangerous speech and association
are hardly specific to the transborder dimension. Domestic speakers and
groups pose serious, even deadly, threats to individuals and to civil peace. Yet,
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as Professor Krotoszynski observes in his review, we do not permit
government to suppress or restrict domestic expression on this basis alone.46
For example, we do not permit the U.S. government to criminalize mere
advocacy by domestic organizations of terrorism or terrorist causes.47 Rather,
even in the face of serious threats to public order and safety, we insist that
officials respect and enforce expressive and religious liberties to their fullest
extent. Why, then, do these obligations disappear when foreign organizations
are the targets of governmental sanction?48
With regard to the community of nations, cosmopolitanism recognizes the
obvious fact that the United States is part of an interconnected web of global
forums, institutions, and relationships. It acknowledges the extent to which
private individuals, corporations, and sub-national governments already
participate in a robust global discourse.49 Indeed, it encourages Congress and
other institutions to leverage that participation for expressive and democratic
ends.50 More generally, cosmopolitanism offers a perspective or approach for
engaging with other nations and peoples—one that gives due respect to the
opinions of mankind, while making the most persuasive case possible for
retaining our exceptional First Amendment doctrines and principles. Thus, for
example, in the Baidu case the United States ought to extend First Amendment
protections to foreign regimes and organizations even if they do not share our
democratic values. In the Liveley case, the United States could extend
recognition and respect to international laws even though this may be
somewhat at odds with certain First Amendment principles.
To those who say we do not owe other nations any explanation, quarter, or
defense when it comes to free speech or religion, cosmopolitanism’s response
is that this perspective ignores America’s deeply embedded and influential
place in the world. This breed of exceptionalism also fails to give due
consideration to the very principles the United States purports to be
defending—not just at home, but across the globe. In First Amendment terms,
what could be more appropriate than teaching a foreign regime—even an
autocratic and repressive one—about democracy and tolerance by extending to
it the very expressive protections it denies to others? Conversely, what
message is conveyed when U.S. courts refuse to enforce international and
46 See Krotoszynski, supra note 1, at 686 (“For a people so reflexively hostile to

government interventions in speech markets, why are we so trusting when the government
tells us that a particular speaker is too dangerous to be permitted in the United States?”).
47 See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam) (protecting
advocacy of governmental overthrow so long as speaker does not expressly advocate
imminent unlawful action that is likely to occur).
48 See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 33–38 (2010) (sustaining
under strict scrutiny a ban on the provision of “material support,” in the form of
coordinated expression, to foreign terrorist organizations).
49 See ZICK, supra note 2, at 270–74 (discussing participation by sub-national
governments, individuals, and private corporations).
50 See id. at 281–96 (applying free speech principles to foreign affairs discourse).
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other foreign laws against American citizens who foment violence or violate
basic human rights abroad? First Amendment cosmopolitanism acknowledges
that the United States cannot simply wall itself off from the rest of the world
and ignore the many expressive and religious liberty regimes that differ from
our own. It provides a perspective that may be useful in terms of engaging
with other nations, one that makes the most persuasive case possible for
retaining our exceptional First Amendment doctrines and principles while at
the same time exhibiting due respect for the opinions and rights of mankind.
Professor Krotoszynski’s review expresses strong skepticism regarding
certain aspects of First Amendment cosmopolitanism. Although he is
sympathetic to my claims regarding protection for Americans’ transborder
liberties, Professor Krotoszynski argues that “the prospects for convincing the
Supreme Court to afford transborder speech greater solicitude seem meager.”51
As well, Professor Krotoszynski writes that he is “very skeptical that United
States courts will prove receptive to considering and engaging foreign free
speech law when deciding First Amendment claims.”52
In response, I would first reiterate that protection for citizens’ transborder
First Amendment liberties is just one aspect of First Amendment
cosmopolitanism. Part II of the book examines an array of cross-border
activities that I contend deserve, but have thus far been denied, full First
Amendment recognition.53 These various activities comprise or facilitate
“conversation and commingling” in transborder spaces, not only through
expression but also through association, press, assembly, and religious
activities.54 However, Part III of the book ventures into the deeper and even
less settled waters of the community of nations.55 It advances the argument,
discussed earlier, that a more cosmopolitan First Amendment would benefit an
array of U.S. policies and practices within the community of nations.56 As the
discussion in Part II of this response shows, focusing solely on protection for
U.S. citizens’ First Amendment transborder liberties understates the broader
scope or domain of my project.
Similarly, in focusing solely on judicial recognition and protection for
cross-border liberties, the review does not address the book’s argument that
other officials are also obligated to recognize and protect transborder liberties.
To be sure, my book focuses on a number of deficient judicial doctrines and
precedents. However, it encourages not just, or even primarily, American
courts to adopt and articulate cosmopolitan values and principles. Rather, I

51 Krotoszynski, supra note 1, at 678.
52 Id.
53 See ZICK, supra note 2, pt. II.
54 Id.
55 Id. pt. III.
56 Id.

718

OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 76:3

contend that cosmopolitan First Amendment principles ought to guide
legislators, agencies, and executive officials as well.57
Thus, for example, I propose that Congress finally repeal the Logan Act of
1799, which purports to restrict Americans’ communications to foreign
regimes or officials engaged in disputes with the United States.58 My book
celebrates Congress’s recent repeal of Smith-Mundt Act restrictions on
domestic dissemination of U.S. foreign propaganda.59 Americans ought to
know what their government is saying on their behalf, regardless of where it
happens to be speaking. The book proposes that lawmakers repeal
international travel bans and other restrictions that interfere with cross-border
inquiry and commingling.60 Relatedly, it urges executive officials to disclaim
any authority to exclude foreign nationals from the United States solely on
ideological grounds.61 It also encourages the United States to fully live up to
its longstanding treaty obligations, and to permit the free flow of persons and
information across borders.62 Finally, the book questions the executive’s
power to target American speakers abroad in lethal drone operations, at least
insofar as the sole or primary basis for the targeting is protected expression.63
One might lack confidence that legislators and other government officials
will be any more receptive to cosmopolitan concerns than courts. However,
these officials are motivated by economic, diplomatic, and other concerns that
can translate into more cosmopolitan policies. Thus, for example, President
Obama recently announced the normalization of diplomatic relations with
Cuba.64 If this ultimately leads to the repeal of the Cuba travel embargo,
American and Cuban citizens will be able to converse and commingle in
ways—artistic, literary, scientific, etc.—that have not been possible since the
ban was imposed many decades ago.
Along with other scholars, I also discuss the influence that federal
agencies, expert technologists, and information intermediaries will have in
shaping the future of cross-border information sharing.65 I encourage U.S.
57 See, e.g., id. at 128 (“Even if the Supreme Court fails to deliver, the political

branches can act on their own to facilitate cross-border exchange between citizens and
foreign visitors.”).
58 18 U.S.C. § 953 (2012).
59 See ZICK, supra note 2, at 298 (discussing partial repeal of the Smith-Mundt Act).
60 See id. at 109–20 (advocating a robust First Amendment right to travel abroad).
61 See id. at 128 (encouraging Congress and the State Department to clarify that
ideological exclusions are prohibited under federal law).
62 See id. at 154 (noting that the United States has entered into international
agreements that obligate it to respect the free flow of persons and information “without
regard to frontiers”).
63 Id. at 194–95.
64 Peter Baker, America Is Freed—Surprise Deal Ends Long Stalemate, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 18, 2014, at A1.
65 ZICK, supra note 2, at 156 (noting that “future debates regarding global information
policy are likely to focus less on judicial interpretations of the First Amendment or
traditional regulatory methods than on regulatory policies concerning new technologies,
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officials and experts to be mindful of the First Amendment’s cosmopolitan
dimension as they work out the terms and structures of global communication,
in areas ranging from intellectual property to global surveillance.66 In
particular, the book recommends against enacting American intellectual
property laws that will have adverse effects on the cross-border and beyondborder flow of information.67 I also call on U.S. executive and legislative
officials to cease pressuring social media and other information intermediaries
to remove content from their sites absent appropriate legal safeguards.68
My book criticizes the federal SPEECH Act, which prohibits enforcement
of nearly all foreign libel judgments in U.S. courts.69 It also denounces, and
urges state legislatures to reject, xenophobic laws designed to prohibit courts
and other officials from recognizing and enforcing “foreign” expressive and
religious laws.70 The book suggests that Congress amend anti-terrorism laws
to ensure that core religious practices such as prayer and religious worship are
exempted, and that executive officials review policies disproportionately
affecting cross-border religious charitable giving.71
Beyond U.S. borders, the book urges U.S. diplomats to adopt a more
cosmopolitan perspective in treaty negotiations and foreign relations
interactions.72 It proposes that in certain foreign relations contexts, Congress
consider adopting a First Amendment-influenced “dialogic” model that
encourages sub-national and other voices to participate in global forums.73 The
book urges executive officials to respect Establishment Clause limits, even
when they are acting abroad.74 It advises that U.S. agencies engaged in
propaganda and information campaigns abroad take into account cosmopolitan
concerns regarding foreign communities, foreign press, and international
obligations.75 The book suggests that similar considerations influence
international trade policies, particularly as they relate to media products and
services.76 It argues, too, that “[i]n its efforts to export free speech norms and

Internet access, intellectual property, and the sharing of data and other information”
(citation omitted)).
66 See id. at 156–60 (outlining some cosmopolitan terms for a twenty-first century
global information policy).
67 See id. at 158 (discussing recent U.S. proposals for addressing global online
piracy).
68 Id. at 159.
69 See id. at 334.
70 See id. at 342.
71 ZICK, supra note 2, at 246–47.
72 See id. at 318–25 (discussing treaty-making and international diplomacy).
73 See id. at 290–93 (discussing dialogic foreign affairs federalism).
74 See id. at 255–62 (examining the extraterritorial application of the Establishment
Clause).
75 See id. at 296–99 (discussing foreign political propaganda).
76 See id. at 361–66.
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practices through free trade, the United States must respect international law
and the sovereignty of foreign nations.”77
In sum, my book offers a broad, multi-institutional approach that is not
limited to, or by, what American judges can or are willing to decide. That said,
I believe that judges could play an important role in recognizing and enforcing
cosmopolitan First Amendment principles and rights. My cosmopolitan
approach builds on the work of scholars such as Rodney Smolla, Lee
Bollinger, and Jack Balkin, all of whom to one degree or another contend that
courts should adopt and articulate First Amendment principles for the modern
era.78 Some of these scholars appear to have more faith in courts (particularly
the Supreme Court) than I do in this regard, while others view the judicial role
as more marginal than my book suggests. What we all have in common is a
desire to see our First Amendment properly situated in an increasingly
interconnected world.
The Supreme Court has at least tacitly acknowledged citizens’ interests in
receiving information from abroad, their right to invite and receive foreign
visitors, and the possibility of some extraterritorial First Amendment
coverage.79 Thus, the seeds of a more cosmopolitan approach were planted
some time ago. One of my goals is to urge that they be harvested. Following
Lee Bollinger’s lead with regard to freedom of the press, my book sketches the
contours of a cosmopolitan freedom of information doctrine that includes fully
recognized rights to transmit and receive information without regard to
borders, to host and commingle with foreign visitors, to associate across
borders, and to access information through electronic and other channels.80
The current Supreme Court is not without cosmopolitan members. Justice
Anthony Kennedy is well-known for his trips abroad, his engagement with
judicial officials from other nations, and his citation of foreign legal
authorities.81 Justice Stephen Breyer has indicated that he is open to
considering how foreign courts interpret expressive liberties.82 It is not clear
77 ZICK, supra note 2, at 363 (citation omitted).
78 See LEE C. BOLLINGER, UNINHIBITED, ROBUST, AND WIPE OPEN: A FREE PRESS FOR
A NEW CENTURY (2010); RODNEY A. SMOLLA, FREE SPEECH IN AN OPEN SOCIETY (1992);
Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of
Expression for the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2004).
79 See Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 308 (1981) (assuming, without deciding, that
American citizens have some free speech rights while abroad); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408
U.S. 753, 769 (1972) (recognizing citizens’ interest in inviting and receiving foreign
visitors); Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301, 305 (1965) (invalidating postal
prior restraint on receipt of propaganda originating abroad).
80 See ZICK, supra note 2, at 153–54 (describing what could be a “landmark” Supreme
Court decision along these lines).
81 See Jeffrey Toobin, Swing Shift: How Anthony Kennedy’s Passion for Foreign Law
Could Change the Supreme Court, NEW YORKER, Sept. 12, 2005, at 42–51 (observing that
Justice Kennedy “has a passion for foreign cultures and ideas”).
82 See Norman Dorsen, The Relevance of Foreign Legal Materials in U.S.
Constitutional Cases: A Conversation Between Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice Stephen
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whether the Court’s newest members, Justices Kagan and Sotomayor, will
generally embrace a provincial model of First Amendment transborder
liberties or would be open to a more cosmopolitan perspective.
Robust protections for domestic free speech and association were not built
in years, but rather in decades and in some cases over centuries. Courts need
time to digest new technologies, distinctive threats, and transformations of
domestic institutions like the press. As Professor Krotoszynski contends, some
of the Supreme Court’s most recent decisions, including Holder v.
Humanitarian Law Project,83 do not provide cause for optimism that a broad
cosmopolitan turn is in the making.84 However, New York Times v. Sullivan,85
Brandenburg v. Ohio,86 and other speech-protective precedents were the
product of experiences involving new threats, distinctive harms, and modern
concerns that pre-dated the decisions by many decades. It took the Supreme
Court until 1964 to discover the “central meaning of the First Amendment.”87
It may take it several more decades to discover that core First Amendment
principles apply to transborder liberties. As Justice Breyer suggested in the
wake of the infamous Koran-burning episode involving Pastor Terry Jones,
which I discuss in the book, questions relating to the First Amendment’s
transborder dimension “will be answered over time in a series of cases which
force people to think carefully” about how to apply the First Amendment in an
era characterized by digitized expression and relatively borderless spaces.88
Still on the subject of judicial cosmopolitanism, Professor Krotoszynski
makes the further, and to me somewhat surprising, claim that dialogue
between domestic and foreign courts—and, presumably, also among U.S. and
foreign political leaders—would not be a very welcome development. He
argues that “a transnational judicial conversation would seem more likely to
produce greater frustration and ill-feelings over the absence of shared
constitutional values than newfound common ground about how best to
reconcile conflicting constitutional commitments to free speech and human
dignity.”89
Breyer, 3 INT’L J. CONST. L. 519, 537 (2005) (“If, for example, a foreign court, in a
particular decision, had shown that a particular interpretation of similar language in a
similar document had had an adverse effect on free expression, to read that decision might
help me to apply the American Constitution.”).
83 Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1 (2010).
84 Krotoszynski, supra note 1, at 676 (“The Supreme Court, ostensibly applying strict
scrutiny, easily sustained a ban on speech and association with foreign groups alleged to
support terrorism.”).
85 N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
86 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam).
87 Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 273.
88 Kate McCarthy, Justice Stephen Breyer: Is Burning Koran “Shouting Fire in a
NEWS
(Sept.
14,
2010,
6:52
AM),
Crowded
Theater?,”
ABC
http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2010/09/justice-stephen-breyer-is-burning-koran-sho
uting-fire-in-a-crowded-theater/, archived at http://perma.cc/C6VL-Q7D4.
89 Krotoszynski, supra note 1, at 675.
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I find this skeptical assertion surprising for a few reasons. First, in his own
comparative free speech scholarship, Professor Krotoszynski has extolled the
virtues of transnational discourse and comparison. As he has persuasively
argued: “It seems entirely fitting that the free speech project itself should serve
as an object of national—and international—debate. A commitment to free
speech without a commitment to discourse and debate on the substance of the
right would be more than a little bit ironic.”90 Professor Krotoszynski has also
observed that “[t]he ideology of free speech seems to have serious
transnational salience.”91 Even if this were not the case, the idea that
transborder discourse about expressive and other rights would be unwelcome
because some participants might experience “frustration and ill-feelings” is
itself antithetical to core First Amendment principles. Again, the point of the
dialogue is not to generate doctrinal orthodoxy but to question and debate
diverse approaches to common problems. As Judge Benjamin Cardozo once
observed, “We are not so provincial as to say that every solution of a problem
is wrong because we deal with it otherwise at home.”92
Perhaps, as Professor Krotoszynski’s comments suggest, the peoples of the
world have reached a point where they have learned all they can from one
another regarding expressive liberties and human rights. I hope that is not the
case. To be sure, we will not agree on all of the particulars. However, the
United States may convince other nations (perhaps, eventually, even some
autocratic regimes) that speech rights ought to be human rights in the broadest
sense of that phrase. The United States can also learn from the international
human rights paradigm, which highlights the importance of things such as the
free movement of persons and ideas across frontiers.
Ultimately, as I observe in the book, transnational discourse may convince
Americans that we have properly calibrated autonomy, liberty, and dignity
concerns in our approach to freedom of speech and that we have properly
divided church and state.93 Like other nations, we may come away from the
conversation more firmly believing in our core principles and convictions.
There is value in that confirmation.94 Part of the value may be the ability to
better articulate why it is that incitement, sharp criticism of government, and
some forms of hate speech must be protected—even, or perhaps especially, in
a digitized and globalized world. What is all but certain is that invoking First

90 RONALD J. KROTOSZYNSKI, JR., THE FIRST AMENDMENT IN CROSS-CULTURAL

PERSPECTIVE: A COMPARATIVE LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE FREEDOM OF SPEECH 222 (2006).
91 Id. at 215.
92 Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 120 N.E. 198, 201 (N.Y. 1918).
93 See ZICK, supra note 2, at 316–17 (discussing the possible outcomes of
transnational engagement).
94 See VICKI C. JACKSON, CONSTITUTIONAL ENGAGEMENT IN A TRANSNATIONAL ERA
75 (2010) (“The willingness to look outside—for confirmation, for challenge, to check
one’s own judgment—illustrates the way in which foreign practice can function as an
interlocutor of domestic law . . . .”).
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Amendment exceptionalism as a conversation-stopper will not facilitate
rational debate or convince other nations to follow America’s lead.
In sum, the cosmopolitan approach that I propose is firmly grounded in
First Amendment principles and norms. It is cognizant of contemporary
conditions, such as the decreased salience of territorial borders, the
complexities relating to overlapping jurisdiction, and the powers and perils of
digital connectivity. The Cosmopolitan First Amendment is not a book
narrowly focused on First Amendment doctrines, as interpreted solely by
courts. Rather, the book calls for a holistic and long-overdue consideration of
an array of transborder expressive and religious concerns. It emphasizes the
First Amendment’s potential to facilitate cross-border conversation and
commingling, its ability to frame international diplomacy, and its place among
global expressive and religious liberty regimes.

IV. COSMOPOLITANISM AND DEMOCRACY
In this final part of my response, I want to address the intriguing
connection Professor Krotoszynski’s review makes between my work and
Professor Redish’s “adversary” First Amendment theory. I agree with
Professor Krotoszynski that the theories are compatible in many respects.95 In
particular, Professor Redish’s focus on autonomy-based democratic values is
consistent with and indeed supports various aspects of First Amendment
cosmopolitanism. I elaborate on this intersection below, focusing in particular
on the relationship between First Amendment cosmopolitanism and
democracy.
First, however, I should address the potential conflicts between the
cosmopolitan and adversary theories. While First Amendment
cosmopolitanism is consistent in many respects with Professor Redish’s
adversarial First Amendment theory, Professor Krotoszynski argues that the
two approaches are on a collision course in other respects. He argues that
insofar as cosmopolitanism advocates or anticipates changes to fundamental
anti-paternalistic free speech doctrines and ideals, it “rests in considerable
tension with Redish’s robust arguments for an uninhibited and wide-open
marketplace of ideas.”96
As Part III of this response suggests, I think the potential for conflict is
overstated.97 As Professor Krotoszynski observes, one of cosmopolitanism’s
central features is preservation of robust transborder First Amendment
liberties. Thus, as he correctly observes, “the accident of geography should not
provide any basis for greater censorial power on the part of the state.”98 So
encapsulated, “a cosmopolitan First Amendment would embrace the values
95 See Krotoszynski, supra note 1, at 670.
96 Id.
97 See supra Part III.
98 Krotoszynski, supra note 1, at 688.
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and underlying theory of an adversarial First Amendment.”99 It would pose no
immediate or existential threat to current First Amendment doctrines relating
to commercial speech, incitement, hate speech, and other exceptional elements
of American free speech law. Indeed, in some cases it would expand the
geographic domain of these protections.
As I have suggested, First Amendment cosmopolitanism does propose that
Americans exhibit greater respect for the diversity of liberty regimes
throughout the world, and that we work toward better justifying and explaining
First Amendment doctrines and principles to an increasingly skeptical global
audience. However, as I make clear in the book, respectful engagement with
the community of nations on these issues does not entail adopting foreign or
international standards. For example, limited judicial enforcement of foreign
laws and judgments would not result in wholesale abandonment of First
Amendment anti-paternalism principles. Thus, under a cosmopolitan regime,
one would generally find that the First Amendment remains distinctly
adversarial and decidedly anti-paternalistic. If there are to be changes in these
postures, they would come as a result of democratic deliberation and
autonomous choice—activities that are wholly consistent with Professor
Redish’s democratic conception.
One important area of overlap between First Amendment cosmopolitanism
and Professor Redish’s theory relates to the central importance of democratic
values to each approach. In The Cosmopolitan First Amendment, I argue that
cosmopolitanism is consistent with traditional First Amendment values,
including the search for truth, self-government, and individual autonomy.100 I
contend that “we need not start entirely from scratch to justify a more
cosmopolitan conception of First Amendment liberties.”101 In particular, I
stress that self-government and marketplace values, properly conceived,
support a more cosmopolitan approach to the First Amendment.
Professor Redish and I both find traditional self-government and
marketplace theories wanting. Professor Redish contends that these theories
are fundamentally flawed owing to their internal inconsistencies and incorrect
assumptions regarding democracy itself.102 I argue that traditional First
Amendment theories place too much emphasis on demonstrable connections to
domestic politics. In place of this narrow conception of democracy, I contend
that we ought to conceive of a twenty-first century analog to Alexander
Meiklejohn’s town hall meeting—“an emerging global theater, an agora that
includes both traditional and digitized forms of transborder exchange and
information flow.”103 As well, cosmopolitanism argues that the marketplace of
ideas does not cease to exist at the water’s edge. It not only expands the
99 Id.
100 See ZICK, supra note 2, at 68–70 (discussing traditional theories).
101 Id. at 85.
102 See REDISH, supra note 2, ch. 3 (critiquing self-government theories).
103 ZICK, supra note 2, at 85 (citation omitted).
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conception of domestic politics to include transborder concerns, but also seeks
to ensure that citizens have access to a wide range of information—much of
which may have nothing to do with casting a ballot or informing debate on
local politics.104
Like Professor Redish, I propose that we think more carefully about the
fundamental relationship between First Amendment liberties and democracy.
One facet of that relationship, which is located at the core of Professor
Redish’s adversary theory, is the connection between individual autonomy and
democracy. Professor Redish’s work examines what it means to be a selfgoverning individual in a contemporary democracy. Under his adversarial
approach, democracy is conceptualized such that it “guarantee[s] each
individual the equal opportunity to affect the outcomes of collective
decisionmaking by lawful means, according to her own interests and values as
she understands them.”105 As Professor Redish explains, “the adversary theory
of free expression provides complete protection to democratic autonomy in all
its manifestations.”106 Under the adversary approach, government is not
permitted to restrict expression and the free flow of information on the ground
that it does not relate to or further collective democratic ends. The choice of
what to say, and what information to pursue and consume, is left primarily to
the individual’s discretion.
Professor Redish’s focus on democratic individualism complements and
supports a more cosmopolitan approach to First Amendment liberties. The free
exercise of democratic autonomy must include the ability to travel abroad, to
speak with foreign audiences, to receive and gather information from foreign
sources, and to collaborate across borders. It must also entail taking full
advantage of new channels of digital conversation and commingling. As Jack
Balkin has observed, traditional self-governance justifications for free speech
are “too narrow in the age of the Internet.”107 Professor Balkin also notes that
in the twenty-first century, people’s exchanges and collaborations often do not
“respect national borders.”108 Thus, he argues, these activities “should not be
protected only because and to the degree that they might contribute to debate
about American politics, or even American foreign policy.”109 Rather, Balkin
contends, they ought to be protected insofar as they contribute to “democratic
culture”—a “culture in which individuals have a fair opportunity to participate
in the forms of meaning making that constitute them as individuals.”110

104 Id.
105 REDISH, supra note 2, at 71.
106 Id. at 72.
107 Jack M. Balkin, The Future of Free Expression in a Digital Age, 36 PEPP. L. REV.

427, 438 (2009).
108 Id.
109 Id. at 438–39.
110 Balkin, supra note 78, at 3.
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As I explain in my book, Professor Balkin’s cultural theory is
cosmopolitan in important respects.111 Modern forms of democratic selfgovernance are increasingly characterized by mass participation and
collaboration across geographically dispersed cultures. As Professor Balkin
observes, the focus of free speech and association is shifting from political
expression to non-political expression and popular culture. Thus, in the
modern era, officials ought to focus on adopting policies that facilitate a wide
array of digital conversation and commingling. The resulting information
flow, which will increasingly traverse territorial borders, will facilitate the
formation of an individualistic democratic culture that is less dependent on
territorial borders, less concerned with the casting of ballots, and less
grounded in collective democratic concerns.
As First Amendment cosmopolitanism recognizes, transborder
conversation and commingling allow individuals separated by thousands of
miles to learn from one another, to share and critically examine political, legal,
religious, and cultural differences, and to acquire new perspectives regarding
these and many other matters.112 Democracy in transborder spaces, including
virtual and tangible forums, will arise from and be defined by individual
autonomy and self-interest rather than pre-defined collective goals.
Professor Redish’s autonomy-based democratic theory complements and
reinforces cosmopolitan objections to various limits on cross-border
communications. His adversarial First Amendment would presumably reject
the position that speech can be restricted solely because it is directed to
individuals who are not part of the American political community. Its
principles also suggest that governmental exclusions of foreign materials,
persons, and ideas, some export controls that limit the sharing of technical
information, and flat bans on the dissemination of U.S. foreign policy
documents inside the United States would implicate and perhaps violate the
First Amendment. Under both adversarial and cosmopolitan approaches,
individuals would decide, based on their own self-interests, which otherwise
legal communications and associations they would participate in or join.

V. CONCLUSION
In sum, in an era characterized by rapid changes in communications
technologies and cross-border intersections, we ought not to allow narrow
conceptions of democracy to inhibit the free flow of persons, information, and
ideas across borders. Whether based on Professor Balkin’s notion of
democratic culture, Professor Redish’s adversarial individualism, or principles
of First Amendment cosmopolitanism, it is imperative that First Amendment
theories and justifications be capable of meeting twenty-first century
challenges. Development of theories that protect democratic autonomy “in all
111 ZICK, supra note 2, at 88–89.
112 Id. at 89 (citation omitted).
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its manifestations” is critically important—not only to domestic political
communities, but also to the peoples and regimes of the world. As I wrote in
the final paragraph of The Cosmopolitan First Amendment:
What the people of the world will need—indeed, what they have always
needed—in order to prevail in [the] battle [against repression] is a repository
of wisdom and experience that demonstrates these things: Why freedom must
prevail over repression; why access to information is a universal good; why
respect for expressive and religious pluralism is critical to global peace; and
why self-governance and self-determination are the destiny of all mankind.
These are the familiar lessons of the First Amendment.113

113 Id. at 374.

